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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-
BANKS AND BANKING-WITNESSES--RIGHT TO PRIVACY
California Bankers Association v. Schultz,
94 S.Ct. 1494 (1974).
F OLLOWING EXTENSIVE HEARINGS, Congress enacted what has become
known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.' In California Bankers
Association v. Schultz, 2 certain parts of the Act were subjected to
constitutional attack by various plaintiffs, including individual bank
customers, a national bank, a bankers association, and the American Civil
Liberties Union,3 representing itself and its bank customer members. The
plaintiffs' challenges rested on the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, tenth, and
fourteenth amendments.4
The Act, as material here, is divided into three main areas:
(1) financial recordkeeping, 5 (2) reports of domestic currency trans-
actions,6 and (3) reports of exports and imports of monetary instruments.7
The Act is not self-executing-rather it requires the Secretary of the
Treasury8 to issue regulations to implement it. 9 The Treasury Regulations
issued pursuant to the Act' 0 were also attacked.
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, stated that the Act was
drafted to help solve two major problems in the area of regulatory, tax,
and criminal laws. The first problem was the impairment in enforceability
of tax, criminal, and regulatory laws caused by a lack of adequate
financial records recorded and stored by financial institutions.1" The
second problem dealt with the use of foreign financial institutions by
United States citizens engaged in "white collar" crime.12 The technique
112 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1970); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1970)
(enacted as Act of Oct. 26, 1970, PuB. L. No. 91-508, 84 STAT. 1114) [hereinafter
cited as Act].
2 94 S.Ct 1494 (1974).
S Hereinafter cited as ACLU.
4 94S Ct. at 1507.
512 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1970); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1970).
6 31 U.S.C. §§ 1081-83 (1970).
T31 U.S.C. §§ 1101-05 (1970).
8 Hereinafter cited as Secretary.
0 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1928b, 1952-53 (1970); 31 U.S.C. § 1053 (1970).
10 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1973).
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adopted by Congress and implemented by Treasury Regulations to solve
these problems was to require recordkeeping and reporting by financial
institutions and also affected individuals.' 3
The Secretary, in responding to the authority granted him by
Congress, issued a set of regulations, 14 which call for banks to keep
records of (1) customer identities, (2) checks and similar instruments
in excess of $100, subject to certain exemptions, and (3) certain other
records.' 5 Financial institutions, including banks, are required to record
credit extensions in excess of $5,000, and to record each advice, request,
or instruction involving the transfer to a person, account, or place outside
the United States of $10,000 or more.16 The Treasury Regulations also
mandate the making of certain reports concerning currency transactions.
Persons receiving monetary instruments sent from outside the United
States or sending monetary instruments outside the United States, whose
value exceed $5,000, are required to file a report with Custom officials. 17
Financial institutions must file reports of domestic transactions involving
currency of $10,000 or more with Internal Revenue.18 In addition, a person
subject to United States jurisdiction must report any interest in a foreign
financial account on his income tax return.19 It is instructive to note at this
point that the required reports and the information therein are available to
".. . any other department or agency of the United States," 20 upon com-
pliance with certain procedural provisions. However, access to the required
records is allowed only upon the meeting of existing legal process.
21
This litigation was initiated in an attempt to enjoin enforcement of
certain provisions of both the Act and the implementing Regulations. A
three-judge district court upheld the recordkeeping provisions and the
reporting provisions relating to foreign currency transactions.22 However,
the Court held the domestic reporting provisions -of the Act unconstitu-
tional since they "... . unreasonably invade the right of privacy protected
by the Bill of Rights, particularly the fourth amendment provision
protecting 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.' "23 The
13 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1973).
14 Id.
15 31 C.F.R. § 103.34 (1973).
16 31 C.F.R § 103.33 (1973).
17 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.23, 103.25(b)-(c) (1973).
18 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22, 103.25(a) (1973).
19 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1973).
20 31 C.F.R. § 103.43 (1973).
2131 C.F.R. § 103.51 (1973).
22 Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242,1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
23 Id. at 1251.
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district court looked not at the narrowly drawn regulations, but rather
considered the broad authority granted by the Act itself.24 On appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court opinion insofar as it upheld
the recordkeeping and reporting provisions relating to foreign currency
transactions, but reversed insofar as the opinion struck down the
domestic reporting sections.
The bank plaintiffs argued that the recordkeeping provisions imposed
by the Regulations violate due process "... . by imposing unreasonable
burdens upon them." 25 Justice Rehnquist cited United States v. Darby,2 6
and Shapiro v. United States,2 7 for the proposition that Congress may
require recordkeeping as an aid in enforcing a valid law.2 8 The bank
plaintiffs insisted Darby and Shapiro were inapplicable since the record-
keeping provisions involved were not in furtherance of any substantive
regulations directed at the banks themselves, but rather were designed to
enforce laws affecting its customers. 29 Therefore, they argued, the Act
places an unreasonable burden on banks. The Court rejected this argument
saying that "provisions requiring reporting or recordkeeping by the paying
institution, rather than the individual who receives the payment, are by no
means unique." 30 Supporting this contention with several examples from
the Internal Revenue Code,"1 the Court then added that banks are not
neutrals in negotiable instruments, but rather are parties to them, in
fact, the "... . most easily identifiable party to the instrument. 32
Two additional arguments advanced by the bank plaintiffs relating to
the recordkeeping requirements were that they constituted a cost burden
to the banks and ".... undercut a depositor's right to effectively challenge
a third-party summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service."33 The cost
burden argument was rejected since the burden is simply a condition
imposed by Congress on banks insured by the federal government.3 4 The
third-party summons argument was dismissed as being premature.3 5
Several plaintiffs, including a national bank, various individuals,
and the ACLU, argued that since the main thrust of the Act is to
24 Id.
25 94 S.Ct. at 1509.
26 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
27 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
28 94 S.Ct. at 1510.
29 Id.
30 Id.
1 TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6041 (a), 6042, 6044, 6045, 6049.
32 94 S.Ct. at 1511.
33 Id. at 1512.
34 Id. The issue of uninsured bank* was not considered since no bank plaintiffs alleged
to be uninsured.
35 94 S.Ct. at 1512,
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enforce criminal statutes, its constitutionality must be measured by
criminal law standards. Specifically, they charged violations of the
fourth, fifth, and first amendments.36
Relying on the fourth amendment, plaintiffs urged the recordkeeping
provisions require banks to unconstitutionally seize records of their
depositors, while acting as an agent of the government. 37 The Court's
answer to this attack was twofold: first, that the required records are of
such a nature that the bank itself is a party thereto; and second, that these
records are available to the Government only by normal legal processA8
Plaintiffs also asserted a fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court's response to this argument was that the
banks, as incorporated organizations, have no fifth amendment rights with
respect to self-incrimination. 39 In regard to the individual depositors, the
Court declared that "a party incriminated -by evidence produced by a third
party sustains no violation of his own fifth amendment rights."
40
The ACLU also asserted a violation of the first amendment right of
association. Their position was that the recordkeeping provisions could be
manipulated by the Government to obtain a list of its supporters.
Although the Court conceded to the ACLU that it had standing to assert
its members' constitutional right of association, it held that such right is
not absolute where there is a compelling governmental interest. Since the
right is not absolute and since no attempted discovery of the identity of
members was alleged, the ACLU's claim was rejected as being premature."
The reporting provisions of the Act are divided into two general
areas: domestic and foreign. The Regulations require reports by financial
institutions of domestic currency transactions involving $10,000 or more,
subject to certain exemptions. 42 Regulations dealing with foreign currency
transactions require reports by individuals of the importation or exportation
of monetary instruments with a value of $5,000 or more. 3 Reports are
also required of any interest in a foreign financial institution."
36 id. at 1513.
37 Id.
38Id. at 1513-14.31 C.F.R. § 103.51 (1973).
3994 S.Ct. at 1514. E.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-84 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
4094 S.Ct. at 1514. E.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (client-
accountant); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913) (bankrupt-trustee).
4194 S.Ct. at 1515.
42 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1973).
43 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1973).
" 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1973),
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Citing Boyd v. United States4 and Stanford v. Texas," the plaintiffs
claimed that the foreign reporting requirements infringed on their fourth
amendment rights. The Boyd case involved a government attempt to
enforce revenue laws by using a statute requiring the defendant or claimant
to produce records. If the records were not produced, government allega-
tions vis-i-vis the records were considered to be confessed. This discovery
type statute was held to be an unreasonable search and seizure in violation
of the fourth amendment.4 7 Plaintiffs relied on the Boyd decision for the
proposition that the coerced reporting section of the Act is an unreasonable
search and seizure. Justice Rehnquist, however, rejected this argument
and for support also cited Boyd: "... entries... in books required by law
to be kept for their [revenue officials] inspection, are necessarily excepted
out of the category of unreasonable searches and seizures. 48
Stanford v. Texas invalidated a search warrant authorizing a search
of Stanford's home for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning
the Communist Party of Texas," 4 as being an unconstitutional general
warrant. Plaintiff's contention was that the required reports of foreign
transactions are so indiscriminate as to be an unconstitutional general
warrant. The Court, in disallowing this contention, said:
The reports of foreign financial transactions required by the regu-
lations must contain information as to a relatively limited group
of financial transactions in foreign commerce, and are reasonably
related to the statutory purpose of assisting in the enforcement of
the laws of the United States.50
The Court also placed emphasis on the foreign commerce nature of
the transactions.
Both the bank and depositor plaintiffs alleged that the Act and
Regulations require unconstitutional self-incrimination in the foreign
currency reporting provisions. The bank plaintiffs' claims were disallowed
based on the unavailability of a fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to a corporation.51 The depositor plaintiffs' claims (and
also the bank plaintiffs' right to assert their customers' privilege) were
dismissed as being premature since none of the depositor plaintiffs made
any specific allegations of possible incrimination.
52
43 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
48 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
47 116 U.S. at 620.
48 94 S.Ct. at 1517, quoting 116 U.S. at 623-24.
49 94 S.Ct. at 1518, quoting 379 U.S. at 478-79.
50 94 S.Ct. at 1518.
1 Id. at 1522.
52 Id. at 1523.
Fall, 19741
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Plaintiffs also challenged the domestic reporting provisions of the Act
and the Regulations implementing them. As mentioned above, the district
court held the domestic reporting provisions of the Act unconstitutional.5 3
However, the Supreme Court viewed the issue, not in terms of the broadly
written Act, but rather in terms of the Regulations themselves.5 The Act
authorizes the Secretary to require reports by both the individual parties
and financial institutions involved55 and to specify which currency trans-
actions should be reported.56 The Secretary, in his Regulations, used only
a portion of the granted authority and required reports only by financial
institutions of currency transactions exceeding $10,000. 57 Viewing the
situation in light of the reports actually required, the Supreme Court
proceeded to answer the asserted constitutional violations.
The bank plaintiffs' first challenge to the domestic reporting regula-
tions was based on the fourth amendment. The Court's response rested in
large part on some broad language in United States v. Morton Salt Co. 58
That case involved Morton's resistance to filing detailed reports concerning
its compliance with a Federal Trade Commission cease and desist order.
Justice Jackson, speaking for the Morton Court, declared that while a
corporation does have some privacy rights ". . . corporations can claim no
equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy....
[L]aw-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that
corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 59
Based on the above reasoning and restricted view of the Regulations
involved, the Supreme Court decided that banks are parties to the
transactions and that the reporting requirements are not unreasonable.
60
Depositor-plaintiffs also attacked the domestic reporting requirements
basing their challenge on the fourth amendment. This issue was dismissed
since none of the depositor plaintiffs alleged that ". . . they were engaged
in the type of $10,000 domestic currency transactions which would
necessitate that their bank report it to the Government. ' 61 Absent such
allegations, the depositor plaintiffs lacked standing.
Bank and depositor plaintiffs also asserted that the domestic
reporting provisions violated the fifth amendment privilege against
53 Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
54 94 S.Ct. at 1519.
55 31 U.S.C. § 1082 (1970).
56 31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970).
57 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1973).
58 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
59 d. at 652.
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self-incrimination. 62 However, this assertion was rejected on the same
basis as the fifth amendment challenge to the foreign reporting regulations;
namely, bank plaintiffs, as corporations, do not have a privilege against
self-incrimination, and depositor plaintiffs' claims were premature.63
As discussed above, in the section on recordkeeping, the ACLU
claimed a violation of the constitutional right of association of its
members. Similarly, the ACLU claimed an invasion of its members'
right of association with respect to the reporting regulations. Justice
Rehnquist's response was that since the ACLU had not alleged that
any of its transactions required a report to be filed, there was not a
concrete controversy presented to the Court.6
The actual decision was by a 6-3 margin. Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Blackmun, filed a concurring opinion in which he cautioned
against "JA] significant extension of the regulation's [domestic] reporting
requirements." Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall filed separate
dissenting opinions. Justice Douglas' opinion focused on the invasion of
privacy which the Act allows. While using different approaches to the
recordkeeping and reporting provisions, the common thread in his
argument was that the Act allows the Government access to a "...
citizen's activities, opinions, and beliefs"66 via his checking account.
Justice Brennan's dissent was based on what he viewed as an unconsti-
tional delegation of congressional authority to the Secretary of the
Treasury.67 Justice Marshall, in his opinion, viewed the recordkeeping
provisions as an unlawful search and seizure, referring to the practice
of informal access by Government agencies to bank records.68 A further
point raised by Marshall was that the recordkeeping itself is the seizure
and not the later Government scrutiny of the individual's account.6
The Justice also agreed with the ACLU that the existence of a list of
ACLU contributors "... surely will chill the exercise of first amendment
rights of association on the part of those who wish to have their
contributions remain anonymous. '70
It is clear that the Act and the Regulations provide the government
with information that has "... . a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax,
or regulatory investigations or proceedings." '7 However, it is also clear
62 Id. at 1522.
63 Id. at 1522-24.
64 Id. at 1523-24.
65 94 S.Ct. at 1526 (Powell, J., concurring).
66 94 S.Ct. at 1531 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
67 94 S.Ct. at 1533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68 94 S.Ct. at 1534-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69Id. at 1535.
70Id.
7131 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
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that the required reports and records constitute a governmental intrusion
into an individual's private affairs. The balancing of these interests-the
Government's need to know versus the individual's privacy rights-presents
an important constitutional issue. This analysis will not attempt to answer
this broad issue but will be confined to a discussion of the particular
impact of the recordkeeping regulations challenged in the case, as it relates
to the delicate balance between the citizen and his Government.7
The California Bankers Association v. Schultz decision represents
an erosion of the individual's right to privacy. The Act allows the
government to use proxies-financial institutions-in order to obtain
information, not on suspected individuals, but rather on every citizen
who writes checks in excess of $100. The estimated number of checks
required to be copied is staggering-20 to 30 billion.73
Justice Douglas pointed out that "[H]eretofore this Nation has
confined compulsory recordkeeping to that required to monitor either
(1) the recordkeeper, or (2) his business." 74 This Act does not have as its
primary purpose the monitoring of either. Rather, it requires the record-
keeper to act as the Government's agent in monitoring the recordkeeper's
customers and clients. Justice Rehnquist's response to this argument is
that certain Internal Revenue Code sections 5 require the "... paying
institution, rather than the individual who receives the payment,"7 6 to
either maintain records or to submit reports. However, this answer is
inadequate in two important aspects. First, the Internal Revenue Code
provisions cited are all designed to help enforce substantive tax legislation.
Second, the bank is only technically the "paying institution" in reference
to a negotiable instrument while the Internal Revenue Code sections deal
with institutions who are in fact the payees and not merely a conduit of
payment.77 Justice Rehnquist, in trying to answer this latter objection,
stated, "The bank is a party to any negotiable instrument drawn upon it
by a depositor."78 However, he did concede that the bank is not a party
72 The reportmaking requirements are not discussed here since the Supreme Court did
not determine their constitutionality.
73 94 S.Ct. at 1528 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
741d. at 1529. See also 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1970) (Licensed firearms dealer required
to maintain records of firearms transactions); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4403
(Persons engaged in business of accepting wagers required to keep daily records).
7594 S.Ct. at 1509 n. 19, 1510.
76 Id. at 1510.
77 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6001. "Every person liable for any tax imposed by this
title, or for the collection thereof, shall keep such records... as the Secretary or his
delegate may from time to time prescribe." This section clearly puts the burden of
information gathering on someone involved in the background of the transaction.
TO 94 S.Ct. at 1511.
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to the background of the transaction.79 Taking a practical look at the
Act, it is apparent the Government is not interested in the transaction
itself, but its real inquiry is into the background of the financial trans-
action-a background which the individuals may seek to keep private.80
The figures on a check ledger mean nothing unless there are also the
names of the drawer and payee to the instruments. It is by use of this
background information that the Government conducts its investigation.
The majority's reliance on Shapiro v. United Statess and United
States v. Darby82 is also questionable. Shapiro involved a fruit and
produce wholesaler subject to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,83
while Darby concerned an employer subject to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938.84 Both cases dealt with recordkeeping and reportmaking
requirements imposed either on the individual involved or his business.
But, in the case at bar, the Act and Regulations require financial
institutions to maintain records not for use in regulating their business
but rather in monitoring their customers' and clients' activities. This is
a significant departure from prior legislation.
Plaintiffs also urged the Act violated their fourth amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Rehnquist rejected this approach
by saying the bank was a party to the instruments involved. But, as
discussed above, while the bank is technically a party to the transaction it
is not privy to the information the government actually seeks-the trans-
action's background. Additionally, Rehnquist stated that the individuals
suffer no infringement of fourth amendment rights since the records are
available to governmental scrutiny only by existing legal process.85 His
position is that "the mere maintenance of the records by the banks under
the compulsion of the regulations invaded no fourth amendment right of
any depositor."8 -In other words, Rehnquist is saying that there is no
search and seizure when the records are made. Justice Marshall's dissent
takes a more pragmatic view of the situation. He said that once the
required records are made "[Tlhe seizure has already occurred." 87 What
the government in effect is doing is requiring financial institutions to com-
pile data of private individuals' monetary dealings without probable cause.
79 Id. See UNmwonM COMmRCiAL CODE § 3-802. (This section deals with the effect of
a negotiable instrument on the underlying obligation); WHITE & SUMMERS, UNFORM
COMmMcItL CODE § 13-20 (1972).
80 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
81335 U.S. 1 (1948).
82 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
83 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
84 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060.
85 94 S.Ct. at 1513-14. 31 C.F.R. § 103.51 (1973).
86 94 S.Ct. at 1514.
87 94 S.Ct. at 1535 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Fall, 19741
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Then once the data is gathered, a governmental department, using existing
legal process, can obtain a transfer of the information-information which
may have been gathered years before the individual became a suspect.
Justice Rehnquist correctly stated that Congress could constitutionally
require that all individuals "engaging in the sending of negotiable
instruments through the channels of commerce maintain a record of such
action."88 However, the individual who made such records would be able
to assert his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination when asked
to produce the records. 89 The Regulations, however, require the financial
institution to keep the records, causing individual customers to lose their
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since the financial
institution then becomes the producer of the evidence.90
The denial of the ACLU's claim that its members' right of association
was violated also represents an erosion of an important Constitutional
right. Justice Marshall made a valid point while discussing this allegation:
"The threat of disclosure entailed in the existence of an easily accessible
list of contributors may deter the exercise of first amendment rights as
potently as disclosure itself." 91 It is, of course, pure speculation to
estimate quantitatively the deterrent effect this decision will have on
potential contributors, not only to the ACLU, but also to the vast number
of interest groups who rely on the public for donations, but it is not mere
speculation that there will be a certain amount of deterrence.
In conclusion, this case represents a compromise of the individual's
right of privacy and right of association in his financial dealings-a
compromise for which there is no compelling governmental interest. The
Regulations set up a nationwide system by which the government forces
financial institutions to act as agents to compile financial data on all
citizens who write checks in excess of $100. The rationale behind the
Regulations is that the required bank records "... have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings."2
88 94 S.Ct. at 1510.
89 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906). See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39, 57 (1968); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-84 (1911). A record by
private individuals of the interstate shipment of all negotiable instruments over $100
could hardly come within the public records doctrine.
9OSee Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Johnson v. United States,
228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
9194 S.Ct. at 1536 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See United States Servicemen's Fund
v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
92 31 C.F.R. § 103.21 (1973).
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While the records undoubtedly will furnish the government with some
useful information to aid in enforcement of federal statutes, the
Regulations sanction an unwarranted and unconstitutional intrusion into
an individual's financial dealings.
DAVID F. DYBvia
ED. NoTm: The application of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was reviewed by the
House of Representatives Task Force on Privacy, chaired by Barry M. Goldwater, Jr.
(R-Cal.). The Task Force recommended limiting the Act's application. The House
Republican Research Committee, chaired by Louis Frey, Jr. (R-Fla.), in a letter
addressed to Republican Congressmen, dated August 21, 1974, approved the
recommendations, stating at p. 5:
On October 26, 1970, sweeping legislation known as the Bank Secrecy Act
became law. The Act's intention was to reduce white collar crime by making
records more accessible to law enforcement officials. However, in accomplishing
its purpose, it allowed federal agencies to seize and secure certain financial
papers and effects of bank customers without serving a warrant or showing
probable cause. The Act's compulsory recordkeeping requirements, by allowing
the recording of almost all significant transactions, convert private financial
dealings into the personal property of the banks. The banks become the
collectors and custodians of financial records which, when improperly used,
enable an individual's entire life style to be tracked down.
The general language of the Act allowed bureaucrats to ignore the intent
of the law and neglect to institute adequate privacy safeguards. The Supreme
Court affirmed this approach by upholding the constitutionality of both the law
and the bureaucratic misinterpretation of it.
Congress must now take action to prevent the unwarranted invasion of
privacy by prescribing specific procedures and standards governing the disclosure
of financial information by financial institutions to Federal officials or agencies.
Congress must enact legislation to assure that the disclosure of a customer's
records will occur only if the customer specifically authorizes a disclosure or if
the financial institution is served with a court order directing it to comply.
Legislation must specify that legal safeguards be provided requiring that the
customer be properly notified and be provided legal means of challenging
the subpoena or summons.
Passage of such legislation would be an important step forward in
reaffirming the individual's right to privacy.
Fall, 19741]
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